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ABSTRACT

Most studies of Nazi propaganda have focused on events
inside Germany. This thesis proposes to examine German
efforts in the United States in the years before American
entry into the Second World War. This will be done by
examining one Nazi agency: the German Library of Information
which operated out of New York City from 1936 to 1941.
The first chapter explores the formation of the German
Library of Information and its goals. The question of whether
it was controlled by the Foreign Office or the Propaganda
Ministry is also discussed.
The second chapter covers the association between the
German Library of Information and George Sylvester Viereck.
This relationship was an important part of the expansion of
the organization after the outbreak of World War II. Viereck
provided the German Library of Information with most of its
editorial guidance.
The third chapter delves into the

German Library of

Information's publication of propaganda pamphlets. Each of
the major pamphlets is examined in detail. These works
attempted to blame Britain for the outbreak, continuation and
expansion of World War II. The publications also stressed
vi

the economic and military strength of Germany and urged the
United States to stay out of the war.
Chapter four focuses on the German Library of
Information's weekly magazine Facts in Review.

The magazine

was set up to provide Americans with the German point of view
on world events. Facts in Review

continued the theme of

British responsibility for the war. Germany's policies in
Europe were explained in its pages as similar to American
policies in Latin America. Facts in Review

tried to convince

its readers that they had the most to gain by working with,
not against, the Third Reich.
Chapter Five discusses the Dies Committee investigation
into the German Library of Information's activities. In
addition to covering the demise of the German Library of
Information, this chapter also discusses the fate of its
American editor George Viereck.

vii

Chapter One
The Origins of the German Library of Information
In August 1934 an Attache at the Washington Embassy,
Richard Sallet, sent a telegram to his superiors at the
Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. He urged Berlin to consider
setting up an official organization to explain Germany's view
of current events. This would take the form of an official
information library to counter anti-German propaganda in the
United States. His letter read in part:
necessary . . .

"[it is] urgently

to start a library of information in the near

future. The population of the middle size and small towns
desire positive information about Germany and it would be a
sin of omission which it would be difficult to repair if we
were to cede this ground too to the unceasing propaganda of
our enemies."1
acted upon.

For two years, however, this advice was not

It was not until May 1936 that an information

library was set up in New York City along the lines of a
traditional information/cultural center.1
2 As tension
1 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C
Volume III, June 14, 1934 - March 31, 1935 (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1959), 1111-1115. Hereafter cited as DGFP.
Letter from Sallet to Berlin, August 3, 1934.
2 For the founding of the German Library see Office of United
States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: United States Government Printing

9
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increased in Europe, the Library gradually became involved
in outright propaganda activities. This expanded role was
defined in a memorandum written by the German Charge Affairs
in Washington D.C., Dr. Hans Thomsen, on September 18, 1939.3
In this dispatch he despaired that Germany was falling behind
in the propaganda contest in the United States.

He felt that

Americans needed to be given access to the German point of
view in those turbulent times. The German Library of
Information was clearly the best vehicle available to spread
this information. Specifically, he recommended that the
Library operate under seven guidelines.4
First, he believed that the organization should stay
clear of openly associating with the Roosevelt
administration's domestic opposition. The Library should
distance itself from the embassy and consulates, and from
groups and individuals that sought similar goals in order to
avoid the possibility of German affiliation sullying these
groups' reputations. This would obviously have precluded any
appeal to the substantial German-American population of the

Office, 1947), 557. This document was the interrogation of Heribert von
Strempel, First secretary at the Washington Embassy and it gave his
version of how the Library came into being. Strempel's recollection put
the founding of the Library in 1937. Since he was not yet with the
Embassy at the time it was founded, and because the United States
Government investigation of the German Library put the date of its
founding in May 1936, the latter date has been chosen.
3 DGFP Series D, Volume VIII, 89-91 and 127-129. The infamous
Kristallnacht of November 9, 1938 had provoked the United States to
withdraw its ambassador to Germany. Germany retaliated and this left the
Charge (Thomsen) in control.
4 Ibid., 127.
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United States. Second, he cautioned against optimism for more
than limited objectives in America as he believed that antiGerman feeling was prevalent among the American people.
Third, he felt that the Library should seek to invoke U.S.
history and the experience of World War I to convince
Americans that their interests would not be served by
entering into another European conflict.

This, Thomsen

contended, would best be accomplished by focusing on the
heavy casualty rate of World War I, the failure of America to
recover its loans from its allies, and Britain's duplicitous
dealings.

Next he recommended that not only should the

Library shy away from openly attacking Roosevelt,

it should

stay out of American politics altogether. This was certainly
advocated with an eye to the embarrassment the Germans had
felt over the exposure of the clear linkage between German
Embassy officials and the Friends of the New Germany (as the
German-American Bund was then known). Such

blatant

association should not be repeated in the case of the German
Library.5 Fifth, he urged against false optimism in Berlin
over such legislation as the Neutrality Acts, pointing out
that these acts, although better than active American
intervention, still favored Britain and France.

Sixth, he

suggested that the most effective tool for propaganda was to

5
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 552-3, has a discussion of some
of the discomfort caused by the confrontation between Washington and
Berlin over the ties between the German Embassy and the Bund. The
Germans would be more cautious in the future.
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stress Germany's support for the Monroe Doctrine and to
assert that Nazi actions in Europe represented a German
version of the doctrine.

Finally, he warned against using

too crude an approach in propaganda and recommended that
American domestic sources be used whenever possible, i.e.,
books and pamphlets actually written and published by
Americans.
This appeal for increased German propaganda did not
include active collaboration with the pro-Nazi political
groups in America such as the Friends of the New Germany,
later known as the German-American Bund. Thomsen expressly
warned his superiors in Berlin that to link the German
government too closely with such groups would be counter
productive.

Certainly, any trip by the leaders of the

Library, as Fritz Kuhn

(the leader of the Bund) had taken to

visit Hitler, would scuttle any attempts to present the
Library as an "objective" organization.

Thomsen also

contended that the propaganda campaign should avoid openly
supporting the American isolationist movement. German
support,

it was feared, would give the American opponents of

isolation the ammunition necessary to repeal the Neutrality
Acts or to enact legislation blatantly pro-British,

such as

the later Lend-Lease A c t .
Thus, in addition to Hitler's general ideas on
propaganda, Thomsen added specific considerations for the
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German Library. These two sets of guidelines did not conflict
with one another.

Hitler's idea of the simple theme

constantly repeated might seem to contradict Thomsen's fear
of too crude an approach in America. Yet, as will be shown
these potential ideological conflicts were resolved without
apparent tension.
Tension on a more basic level, however, existed between
the Foreign Office under Ribbentrop's control and the
Propaganda Ministry under Joseph Goebbels. The Third Reich
was notorious for the competition between Hitler's underlings
in their quest for individual power. This was certainly true
in the case of foreign propaganda. An excellent example of
the conflict that often occurred between the factions was
given by a veteran member of the Washington Embassy, Dr.
Heribert von Strempel:
German foreign policy was emerging on two parallel
roads-the Foreign Office and the foreign section of the
Party. As long as they remained parallel, the Foreign
Office did not take special action . . . Our policy [at
the Foreign Office] was not to interfere with affairs in
America which might have caused a breach of diplomatic
relations. The activities of Mr.Kuhn [leader of the
German-American Bund] and the foreign section of the
Party were considered a burden on German-American
relations, so Mr. Dieckhoff [the German ambassador to
America] recommended that they be stopped.6

As far as the German Library

was concerned, the

relationship was clearer, but still somewhat murky. Von
6

Ibid., 553.
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Strempel tried to clarify the matter during interrogation by
Captain Sam Harris:

Strempel: From 1939 on, the Library was controlled and
financed by both the Ministry of Propaganda and the
Department of Information in the Foreign Office. You
see, in 1939, Hitler issued an order that from that time
on, foreign propaganda would be handled by the Foreign
Office.
Sam Harris: That would seem to indicate that the
Foreign Office superseded the Propaganda Ministry in the
German Library of Information?
Strempel:
Well, not completely, the Library was under
the
control of Dr. Hans Borchers . . . and . . .
Professor Mathias [sic]
Schmitz . . . [both] of the
Foreign Office. Actually Schmitz was paid a salary by
both the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry,
but accepted only the salary from the Foreign Office.7

This exchange is a convincing answer to the question of
whether the Propaganda Ministry or the Foreign Ministry
controlled the German Library of Information. Given the tone
of its writings

(except for Hitler's speeches the diatribe

against the Jews never appears) and the frequent quoting of
Ribbentrop (but never Goebbels) , along with Strempel's
statement, it is clear that by the later period of its
existence

(1939-1941) the Library was controlled by the

Foreign Ministry.
Although the Library avoided domestic opposition groups,
it was involved with other German front organizations in the
7

Ibid., 557-8.
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United States. The pamphlets and writings of the German
Library of Information frequently appeared at other
organization's meetings, including domestic groups such as
the Bund. The German Library distributed its publications
free of charge, but as far as can be determined none of its
officials directly associated themselves with any of these
meetings.

The Trans-Ocean news service and the German

Railroads Information Office cooperated with the Library,
primarily providing assistance and cooperation in obtaining
names for the Library's mailing list.8
The mailing practices of the Library would lead to
trouble. Many of those who had applied for information about
travel in Germany were surprised to find themselves regularly
receiving German propaganda. Several individuals complained
to their congressmen.9 This practice would eventually
contribute to an investigation of the Library by the House
Un-American Activities Committee. This, however was in the

8 The Trans-Ocean organization was a Propaganda Ministry news
service. On several occasions it provided the Library with articles
which it later published. The German Railroads Information Office is
somewhat more obscure. It appears to have been under the control of both
the Propaganda Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. For links between
German Library and the Trans-Ocean News Service see U.S. House of
Representatives. Special Committee to investigate Un-American Activities
and Propaganda in the United States, Appendix, part 2, 75th Congress,
2nd Session. For more on the German Railroads Information Office See 0.
John Rogge, The Official German Report (New York: Thomas Yoseloff,
1961), 55-6. Rogge was the Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney
General in charge of the Wartime Sedition Case. The Official German
Report was his story of the investigation into Nazi activities in the
United States.
9 U.S. House of Representatives. Special Committee to investigate
Un-American Activities and Propaganda in the United States, Appendix,
part 2, 75th Congress, 2nd Session, 1053. Hereafter cited as Appendix.
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future. For the Library actions of greater importance were
afoot. On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The
Second World War had begun. The Foreign Ministry had plans to
greatly expand the Library's efforts. For this to occur, the
German Library needed strong leadership, which it would soon
find in the person of George Sylvester Viereck.

Chapter Two
George Sylvester Viereck and the Library
The most important link between the Library and other
Nazi front groups was the German-American propagandist George
Sylvester Viereck. Viereck was born in Munich in 1884, and had
been active in propaganda in America as early as the First
World War. As a United States citizen, his activities during
that period had included the publication of a
called the Fatherland.

magazine

The colorful and clever German-

American resumed his activities when the Hitler regime took
power. The Library retained Viereck to assist with the
publication and distribution of its pamphlets and the weekly
magazine Facts in Review. His duties included editing as well
as providing substantially to the Library's mailing lists.
Heribert von Strempel later explained why Viereck had been
chosen for the job: "Viereck was chosen for these antiBritish propagandist activities because he was considered an
experienced American author who could manage efficiently
and rather independently this anti-British propaganda
[the Library and Viereck's publishing house, Flanders Hall]
without interfering in the internal affairs of the United
States." 11
1 Emphasis added. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 561.
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Viereck was also involved in other activities not
directly related to the German Library. These included his
publishing house —

Flanders Hall —

and numerous other

commitments, all of which insured that he would would receive
a large income. From each book published by Flanders Hall
Viereck earned from $5,000 to $10,000.2 Clearly Viereck did
not undertake his relationship with the Library out of
financial necessity. Why, then, did George Viereck become
involved with the Library?
In September 1939, when Viereck first began his
activities on behalf of the Library,

he made his intentions

known when accepting the job in a letter to director Heinz
Beller. He "would be glad to prepare . . . articles
interpreting the German point of view based on data furnished
by you."3 However, he made the limitations of this contract
clear:
In the . . . remote contingency of a break between
the United States and Germany, we are both automatically
released
from any obligation flowing from this
agreement . . . . I shall not be asked to prepare or
edit any matter derogatory to the United States, or to
undertake any editorial assignment which could possibly
conflict with American laws and my duties as an
American citizen.4

2 The Official German Report, 135-6. Viereck also drew a salary of
$500 a month from a German newspaper and an additional $500 per month
from the Library (although this latter amount would increase).
3 Reprinted in Appendix, 1050.
4 Ibid., 1051.
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Certainly this closing of a private letter shows no unAmerican cynicism on the part of Viereck towards his German
Library

activities.

Whatever else may be said about the man

and his activities, he seems to have sincerely wished to
avoid conflict between America and Germany. What is beyond
question is that his talents greatly aided the German Library
and especially Facts in Review. In the opinion of Ambassador
Dieckhoff, Viereck "plays a decisive part in the publication
of the Embassy Journal Facts in Review.

He may be called the

most valuable liaison agent of the Information Section
the Foreign Office]

[of

in the United States."5

George Viereck, while not officially recognized as the
editor of Facts in Review,

did much to improve the little

magazine. Certainly he felt that he did an excellent job. In
fact he wrote to Matthias Schmitz, Beller's successor as
director of the Library, asking for an increase in salary:
When I was first associated with Facts in Review,
its circulation did not exceed a few thousand copies,
and you did not print more than four pages a week. Today
the circulation is nearly 100,000 and you print 16
pages every week, not to speak of occasional extra
numbers. While undoubtedly the lion's share of this
success is due to your own editorial guidance, I have
some share in the success of the venture.6

Then Viereck got down to his real purpose,
5 Memorandum of German Foreign Office dated March 3, 1941, quoted
in Official German Report, 132-3.
6 Letter Jan 25, 1941 G. S. Viereck to Matthias Schmitz.Reprinted
in Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn, Sabotage: The Secret War Against
America
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), 172.
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You asked me what would be equitable renumeration
. . . . I reached the figure of $2,500 per month . . .
American magazines never pay me less than $500 per
article. . . . The work I do in revising and preparing
material for Facts in Review is equal to at least four
or five articles monthly.
For the sum mentioned I
shall continue my work for Facts in Review and act as
your chief literary advisor on all books sponsored by
the Library.7

It is interesting how Viereck chose to close his letter to
Schmitz.

"You [are] a man who, like myself,

. . . considers

no task more sublime than to break down with the battering
ram of truth the barriers of hate and misunderstanding which
[British] propaganda, abetted by malice and ignorance,
attempts to rear between your country and my own, the United
States."8
While the retention of Viereck was of help to the German
Library, the association violated Thomsen's guidelines for
German propaganda activity in the United States.

Clearly it

would be to Germany's benefit if domestic opposition to
Roosevelt's increasing intervention in the war was seen to be
independent of German "control".

Certainly, the relationship

with Viereck was not publicized. Rather, the Special
Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, O. John Rogge,
discovered the link, and afterward used it to prosecute
Viereck for sedition. Viereck was eventually convicted for
7 Ibid. See also Rogge, The Official German Report, 135 for total
amounts Viereck received from the German Library . For 1940 he was paid
$31,552.43 and for 1941 (from January to June) $32,294.09. His letter
seems to have paid some dividends.
8 Sabotage, 172.
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failing to register properly under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act. However, he had escaped an earlier
conviction in 1942 under this act when the Supreme Court
overturned the case on a technicality. Rogge clearly feared
the possibility that Viereck would again avoid conviction
when he wrote his book The Official German Report

(September

1946) .
Among those who argued against Viereck's conviction had
been North Dakota Senator William Langer. Viereck wrote to
Langer requesting assistance.9 Langer supported Viereck:
"Because of that wrongful conviction, Mr. Viereck has been
put to a tremendous expense.

...

I shall submit a

resolution to . . . [the Senate] to decide on a sum which . .
. will compensate him for the time he spent in jail . . .Mr.
Viereck will get such justice as Congress may be able to give
him . . .

to wipe out the wrong which has been done."101 In the

Senate Langer did just that. He came out vigorously in
support of those on trial along with Viereck for sedition:
"Some of the outstanding lawyers in Washington are almost
unanimous in their opposition of what they term a legal
farce, or a perversion of justice."11 Rogge, in order to
counter the support given by the senator, accused Langer of

9 For the content of Viereck's plea, see below p. 64.
10 Rogge, The Official German Report, 44 0.
11 Senator William Langer, address before the United States
Senate, September 8, 1944. Congressional Record Volume 90, part 6
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 7624.
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"a checkered political career" for

his activities in land

dealings in Mexico and other supposedly shady dealings. He
concluded,

"In view of Viereck's record, and also

Senator Langer's,

[of]

I submit that Senator Langer's support of

Viereck's demand for clemency should carry no weight."12

This

was all in Viereck's future. In September 1939 if an
individual such as Viereck was interested in Germany and
chose to use the Library's materials
that was his own business.

(a possible explanation)

After all, the reason for the

Library was to give Americans access to the "other side".

12
The Official German Report, 444. Viereck spent two and a half
years in prison for failing to fully report his activities, see below
p. 64. He was never convicted on the sedition charge. The case against
Viereck and several others was dismissed after the war ended.

Chapter Three
Pamphlets
The German Library of Information's first publications
were translations of official government documents. While the
pamphlets as a general rule were basically reprints of
official German "white books" originally published in
Germany, the German Library supplied prefaces to these works,
thereby fulfilling its mission to provide Americans with the
German point of view on major issues.
The first pamphlet, published in 1939 under the title,
The Exchange of Communications Between the President of the
United States and the Chancellor of the German Reich: April
1939, was a reprint of Roosevelt's famous speech to Hitler,
urging him to take a peaceful course in Europe, and Hitler's
reply to this message, rejecting Roosevelt's request for a
German guarantee of neutrality toward several small nations.
Hitler brushed aside Roosevelt's fears, alleging

that his

concerns amounted to hysteria "which makes even the landing
of Martians seem possible"1 (this was a reference to Orson
Welles' broadcast of the War of the Worlds in 1938 that had1
1
Exchange of Communications Between the President of the United
States and the Chancellor of the German Reich: April 1939. (New York:
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caused mass hysteria in the United States.) While this
document is interesting to the student of history, it
represented an early stage of the German Library's
propaganda. As a simple reprint of a German document, this
work tells little about the opinions of the Library. Of more
interest was the open acknowledgement of the German Library
as part of the Consulate in New York, although the Library
would soon try to distance itself from the stigma of being an
official German agency.
The volume titled Documents Concerning the Last Phase of
the German-Polish Crisis is more revealing. Clearly its
reasoning is based on one premise: the underlying
responsibility of Britain for the war. This argument was
based on the then-current idea that World War I had begun
because of Germany's "Blank Check" to Austria-Hungary. This
supposedly had encouraged the Habsburg nation to attack
Serbia. The conflict rapidly escalated into a European-wide
conflagration. The Library argued that Britain repeated this
mistake in 1939 by supporting Poland. The pamphlet argued
that,

"Germany's demands

[about the Polish Corridor] were so

reasonable that no sane Polish Government would have dared to
reject them. They certainly would have been accepted if
England had advised moderation."2 As Germany had failed to
restrain its ally in 1914, so had Britain failed to convince
German Library of Information, 1939).
2
Documents Concerning the Last Phase of the German-Polish Crisis
(New York: German Library of Information, 1939) 6.
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Poland to accede to German claims in 1939. The conclusion was
obvious: America needed to realize that it was "England that
forced the sword into his [Hitler's] hand."3 This pamphlet set
one of the primary themes for German Library

propaganda,

namely that Britain, by its interference on the European
continent, had made Germany's situation in Europe impossible.
The next Library work, Polish Acts of Atrocity Against
the German Minority in Poland, published in 1940, repeated
the theme. The body of this work was dedicated to describing
in morbid detail the "systematic campaign of destruction,
carried on not only by armed civilians, but by

responsible

officials of the Polish Government."4 What is interesting
about this volume is the number of cases reported (250) , each
of them in nauseating detail.5

Significantly,

none of these

atrocities took place prior to September 1, 1939.

The Nazi

justification for invading Poland to protect German nationals
fell flat even in the German Library publication. After
claiming the existence of a long-standing Polish government
plan to exterminate the German minority in Poland, the
pamphlet pointed to the ultimate responsibility of Britain:
"Nor is it possible to forgive or forget that the 'Blank

3 Ibid., 3.
4 Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the German Minority in Poland
(New York: German Library of Information, 1940), 10
5 Some of the titles of the interviews comprising the report were
"Slay the Germans: Eyes Gouged out with Bayonets", "All Germans must be
Butchered", "Legs and Hands Broken; Tongues, Noses, Ears Cut Off."
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Check' so hastily given to Poland by Mr. Chamberlain's
Government and its failure to recommend the acceptance of
Chancellor Hitler's generous terms

were the signal for the

slaughter of the German minority."6
The theme of British responsibility for the expanding
war continued in Britain's Designs on Norway.

It, like most

of the German Library publications, consisted of a short
introduction followed by various letters and other allegedly
captured documents.

In this work the German Library

stated

plainly its opinion of Britain's goals in the war:
Britain's strategy is always the same: adroit
propaganda, a vast net of espionage, the creation of
"fifth columns," and the attempt to inveigh into her
web members of the government and the army of the State
upon which she fastens her clutches.
While engaged in
this game she invariably hides her imperialistic schemes
under the cloak of morality and wards off suspicion from
herself by diverting it to others.7

Furthermore, Britain's Designs on Norway

sought to remind

Americans of Britain's abuse of neutral rights. Invoking the
voice of Woodrow Wilson, the Library railed against Britain's
resumption of the World War I practice of an "illegal and
indefensible" blockade.8 In contrast to this the pamphlet
claimed that Germany's "sole objective is to destroy the
power of Great Britain to meddle in Continental affairs."9
6 Ibid., 11.
7 Britain’s Designs on Norway (New York: German Library of
Information, 1940), xi.
8 Ibid., xiii.
9 Ibid.
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In Allied Intrigue in the Low Countries, even neutral
nations were alleged to be working towards the "overthrow of
the German Government and the perpetuation of the intolerable
condition existing on the Continent due to the incessant
interferences of Great Britain." 10 It was concluded that the
Allies planned to use the Low Countries as a springboard for
an invasion of Germany, and therefore the German invasion and
occupation of these nations was justified.11
The French Yellow Book: A Self Indictment extended the
blame for the war to the Third Republic.1
12 The work claimed
0
that "all the Fuehrer's efforts for peace were doomed to
failure because they collided with the war plans of England
and France."131
4 The documents contained in this volume
supposedly made clear the war plans of the Allies. According
to the German Library of Information this policy was
"sometimes referred to as the 'policy of firmness' and
sometimes frankly and harshly as 'encirclement'."1,5

10 Allied Intrigue in the Low Countries (New York: German Library
of Information 1940), vii.
11 Planning between the Low Countries and the Allies did occur
with good reason. The wisdom of this cooperation was shown by the wellknown incident when early German invasion plans for the West (under the
code name Case Yellow)
fell into Belgian hands in January 1940. These
plans made it clear that Germany intended to invade France via the Low
Countries.
12 Which, incidentally, did not appear until 1941, after France
had been defeated and the Third Republic had ceased to exist.
13 Dr. Friedrich Grimm, The French Yellow Book: A Self-Indictment
(New York: German Library of Information, 1941), 9-10. The various
pamphlets issued by the German Library sometimes listed authors,
sometimes not.
14 Ibid., 42.
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The theme shifted back to the "evils of Britain" after
the French Yellow Book.

In the Second Hunger Blockade

by

Hermann Frisch, the words of President Woodrow Wilson
regarding the illegality

of a blockade were reiterated.

Americans were reminded not only of the human suffering
caused by naval blockades, but also of the opposition to the
practice by many great American leaders. Regardless of the
British attempts at blockade, the work sought to project an
invulnerable Germany where "victory can no longer be
endangered by a collapse of the home front."15
The Library believed Britain to be much nearer to
defeat. The War in Maps, 1939/40, edited by Giselher Wirsing,
was a pictorial history of "the practical expulsion of Great
Britain from the European Continent, where she is an unwanted
intruder."16 This work traced the progress of the war around
the world until 1940. It is the best edited of all the
pamphlets artistically, with good color maps. It sought to
show England lusting for expansion and a France determined to
humiliate Germany. Allied propaganda was dismissed as "a mask
behind which hides, in England, the jingo lust for further
enlargement of the Empire; and in France, the wish to . . .
prevent German unity at any price whatever."17

15 Hermann Frisch, The Second Hunger Blockade (New York: German
Library of Information, 1941), 22.
16 Giselher Wirsing, ed. The War in Maps, 1939/40 (New York: The
German Library of Information, 1941), i.
17 Ibid., 48.
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The next Library booklet,

Werkstoffe: Miracles of German

Chemistry, by Karl Dorn, affirmed Germany's ability to
weather a British blockade of raw materials by the invention
of marvelous synthetic substitutes, defined as "a working
[synthetic] material . . . chiefly for industrial purposes."181
9
This work reminded the Library's readers of Germany's
successful innovations in nitrate experiments in World War I.
It maintained that Germany had developed workable substitutes
for rubber, gasoline and other vital raw materials. It was
asserted that these innovations were not merely ersatz
materials of sub-par quality, but genuine scientific advances
that would aid the world after the war. It is interesting to
note that Werkstoffe took pains to assure America that these
innovations would be shared with all; they were not
attempts by Germany to abandon world trade via economic
autarchy.
Somewhat different in character was Germany: Facts and
Figures .19 Here the German Library of Information attempted to
present a picture of a pacifistic Germany. The booklet
stressed Nazi achievements and the religious solidarity
between Catholic and Protestant Germans, and also minimized
the idea of class conflicts within the

Reich, or the demise

of alternative political parties. It maintained the

18 Karl Dorn, Werkstoffe:Miracles of German Chemistry (New York:
German Library of Information, 1941), v.
19 Germany: Facts and Figures (New York: German Library of
Information, 1941).
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strength of the nation and its need for "living space" —
the infamous Lebensraum.

Most of all it pictured a virile,

growing Germany forced to take a military option only when
others failed to disarm (as they were supposed to under the
terms of the Versailles Treaty), preventing the peaceful
settlement of Europe's problems.
A Nation Builds: Contemporary German Architecture
continued the trend. This pamphlet painted a picture of a
strong, vital peace-loving Reich, more interested in
autobahns than aeroplanes. The change of life since the
National
Socialist regime was glorified: "The great building program
which has been taking place in Germany during the last 6
years . . . may be interpreted as the symbol of the
philosophy of life which animates the New Germany. Germany
was building for peace."20 It also stressed the idea of a
national theme that dominated all aspects of life.

"All of

the building encompassed in the plan expresses a unifying
idea.

. . . the ideas of social equality and national unity

which are the basic ideas of the New Germany."21 National
Socialism was even given credit for truly uniting Germany.
"[The autobahns] have performed a political and social
mission as well. They have been an important factor in
overcoming the sectional separateness, which has always been
20 A Nation Builds: Contemporary German Architecture (New York:
German Library of Information, 1941), 11.
21 Ibid., 11.
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a major problem in the creation of a united German state."22
Thus, the pamphlet represented Germany as a strong peaceloving nation that was not threatening to Europe or America.
Germany was the land of culture and could be dealt with and
trusted.
Other works by the Library sought to show the artistic
side of Germany that was all too frequently submerged by the
aggressive activities of the Third Reich. A pamphlet was
issued commemorating the romantic painter Casper David
Friedrich. A book on German Christmas carols and toys was
also published. These were a different approach by the
Library, devoid of any stated political messages. No plea for
American sympathy appeared. What was under the surface was
plain: the Germany of Goethe, the artistic and peace-loving
German, was still alive in the Third Reich. These efforts
were more successful in eliciting understanding than dry
discourses on Lebensraum or the German right to a
readjustment of Versailles.
The last of the German Library

pamphlets of concern

here was a self-examination entitled The German Library of
Information. Unlike the other pamphlets,
of Information

The German Library

was a Library publication, not just a

translation with an English preface. This work explained the
details of the Library and its purpose.

22

Ibid., 117
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The German Library of Information was founded
several years ago to satisfy American demands for
detailed knowledge of all phases of German life. . . .
The fundamental aim of the German Library of
Information in New York is to facilitate an
understanding of Germany, [emphasis added]
her
countryside, her people, her government and her
cultural heritage. . . . By promoting a greater
knowledge of Germany, it furthers understanding and
good-will between two great nations.23

The German Library functioned "independent of the Consulate"
and therefore was not an official government agency.24
Presumably this would have made the Library's arguments more
persuasive.

The work hastened to remind Americans that the

German Library of Information's goal (in reference to the
weekly Facts in Review

published by the German Library ) was

to show "the 'other Germany,' which hostile propaganda
constantly endeavors to consign to the past, remains an
essential part of the Reich of today."25 A new era of
cooperation,

it claimed, would be the result of this new

relationship: "By encouraging and enabling Americans to
familiarize themselves with the German people and their
heritage, the road to mutual
understanding is opened.

. . . American and German culture

have long enriched each other. To the future belongs the task

23 The German Library of Information (New York: German Library of
Information, 1941), 5.
24 This was a shift in the status of the Library. Recall that the
German Library had earlier maintained that it was a part of the
Consulate. Ibid., 19.
25 Ibid., 17.
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of still further increasing the understanding and
collaboration between the two countries."26

26 ibid., 27.

Chapter Four
Facts in Review
With the increasing international tensions and the
threat of a war in Europe in 1939, the role of the German
Library

changed. As we have seen in the case of its

pamphlets, the Library put out a rapidly increasing amount of
propaganda. The most conspicuous evidence of this increase
was the emergence of the weekly Facts in Review.

Thomsen had

written to Berlin in November 1939, informing his superiors
that the "stiffening of German-American relations, which was
being exploited by enemy propaganda, has made necessary since
the beginning of the year a more active German propaganda in
the United States.

. . .nl He also told Berlin that the Trans-

Ocean Agency (which was controlled by the Propaganda
Ministry) was recognized by Americans as obviously pro-Nazi.
He noted that "American newspapers avoid regular printing of
Trans-Ocean material."1
2 These circumstances encouraged an
expanded role for the German Library of Information. Thomsen,
in a report to Berlin explained the situation: "In order to
get over this boycott wall of the American press, the weekly
periodical Facts in Review

was founded, which now regularly

1 DGFP, Series D, Volume VII, 432-4
2 Ibid., 432.
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reaches 20,000 especially interested persons; all materials
of the Foreign Ministry, particularly political reports, are
utilized for i t ."3 Thomsen also noted that "The German
Information Library in New York was developed into an
institute of propaganda."4
In response to its new role, the Library was officially
separated from the New York Consulate and received separate
and extensive funding. Just how much money the Library
received from all sources is not clear. Heribert von
Strempel,

from the Embassy, estimated that the German Library

was paid $600,000 from embassy funds alone during the period
from 1939 to 1941. As stated previously,

(p. 11-12) the

Library received funding from both the Foreign Ministry and
the Propaganda Ministry,

so it is possible that the German

Library of Information received from $750,000 to $1,000,000
from all sources for the years 1939 to 1941.5
By far the most significant increase in the output of
German Library of Information propaganda came when the weekly
journal Facts in Review

began publication. Thomsen noted in

November 1939 that "the periodical is proving a success and

3 Ibid., 433.
4 Ibid. Since the German Library was set up as a propaganda
agency before this time, two meanings of this sentence are possible.
First, Berlin may not have been aware of the Library's existence.
Possibly since the German Library had been a Propaganda Ministry
organization when it was first set up,the Foreign Office may not have
been aware of it, or it may have been an announcement that the Foreign
office had won a struggle over control of the German Library .
5 See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 557-559.
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is quoted and occasionally attacked by the American press."6
Facts in Review

not only addressed major issues, as the

pamphlets had done, but also provided information on German
internal news such as employment levels, cultural information
and a list of German-English language broadcasts and books.
All of this was done in a neat and homey, if somewhat
contrived fashion.

But this format had the advantage of

appearing less overtly political to the reader than
translations of official documents.
Facts in Review
Library

was widely distributed, as the German

had a mailing list of 70,000 names garnered by

Viereck. The estimate of the journal’s circulation varied fromaround 40,000 a week according to Strempel, to 70,000, as
estimated by the House Un-American Affairs Committee, which
investigated the Library. The number the Committee put forth
seems a more reliable figure, since Congress possessed a
physical copy of the list; Strempel's interrogation occurred
five years after the Library ceased to exist.7
In addition, its funding rose to significant levels. The
Library's expenses mushroomed quickly after the start of the
war. From May 1936 to August 1939 the Library spent $63,300.
From September 1939 to March 1940, it spent $89,000. Finally,
from April 1940 to August 1940 it spent $189,394.8

For Facts

6 Ibid., 433.
1 For the House records on the mailing list see Appendix, 1050.
For Strempel's version, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 558.
8 Appendix, 1045-1050.
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in Review

alone the Library received

over

$13,000 per

month. For the period from April 1940 to August 1940 the
expenses for Facts in Review were $66,378.96. These figures
represented the expenses of producing the magazine when it
averaged around ten pages in length. As the weekly continued
it grew in size to over forty pages. No doubt the expenses
for Facts in Review saw an increase as well. However, similar
data for the later, more lavish, issues is not available.
Nevertheless, the early figures provide an idea of the large
amount of capital invested by the Library in Facts in Review.9
Facts in Review
activity.

remained the most significant Library

While the Library had some leeway in the

publication of its various pamphlets,

it was limited in its

ability to issue an independent opinion, because the
pamphlets were usually reprints of government publications.10
In the publication of Facts in Review, the German Library of
Information adhered closely to Dr. Thomsen's guidelines for
German propaganda. Throughout the year and a half of its
publication (the magazine first appeared in August 1939 and
lasted until the consulate and Library were closed on
Roosevelt's orders on June 16, 1941),

Facts in Review

continually espoused two of Thomsen's most important ideas.
First, Americans were constantly reminded of the betrayal of
9 Appendix, 1048 for a break down of the production costs for
Facts in Review.
10 The limitations were most severe in the case of the German
White Books and would not have been nearly so much a problem in the
case of other publications. See above p. 23.
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Wilson's fourteen points and the denial of Germany's right to
national self-determination. The second major theme of the
periodical was that Germany's goals in Europe represented no
more than a German Monroe Doctrine and that the U.S. should
easily appreciate such a policy.

Each of these points about

Germany was contrasted to British behavior,

in the first part

by its support of Poland's refusal to honor the selfdetermination principle in Danzig and, in the second, by
Britain's continuing imperialistic role in the World.
in Review

Facts

also focused on presenting the "other" Germany of

peace and culture.

Another primary purpose of the journal

was to explain to Americans Germany's point of view on
current events.
The first issue of Facts

appeared shortly before the

outbreak of World War II, although its role was not
explicitly proclaimed until 1940: "It is the function of this
publication to preserve the mutually beneficial intellectual
contact between Germany and the United States, which great
Americans including Longfellow, Emerson, Burgess and others
esteemed so highly."11 It continued:
of German life and development

"The wealth and variety

[are] mirrored in the pages of

Facts in Review . . . the eternal values which enriched the
Old Germany, are alive in the New [Germany]. The Third Reich,
while preserving these values, has made new and notable

11

Facts

in

Review,

April 10, 1940, p. 160.
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contributions to civilization, some of which are presented in
these pages.1,12
Using the lists organized by Viereck, the issue was
mailed out to various individuals and organizations.1
13 By late
2
August 1939 it had become clear that some sort of conflict
was near

(how widespread it would be was not clear).

Appropriately, the inaugural issue contained a
detailed description of the German need for "living space"
(Lebensraum). Two ideas that would resurface throughout the
journal were featured prominently in this first issue.

The

first was the ultimate responsibility of Great Britain for
the war and its spread. The second was that German actions in
Europe "should be recognized throughout the world - as is the
Monroe Doctrine."14 This explanation of Nazi ambitions as
Germany's Monroe Doctrine for Europe, would continue
throughout the journal's run. Together these two themes
formed the backbone for the majority of the German Library's
arguments.
12 Ibid.
13 Facts in Review generally arrived about a week after its

publication date.There is some evidence that some of the earliest issues
may have been prepared earlier but not mailed until after the date
listed. The copies of Facts in Review viewed by the author at the
University of Minnesota had a date received stamp on them. This
date was usually seven days after the publication date— a not
unreasonable postal delivery time at magazine rate. The first issue for
August 16, 1939 bears a stamp for Oct 12, 1939. The second issue
did not arrive until January 1940. However issues three through
seven arrived on October 12, 1939, before the second issue, at the
same time as the first issue. It is not certain what the cause for
the delay of the first two issues was, but it seems likely that
the issues were hastily prepared, after their publication date.
14 Facts in Review, August 16, 1939, p. 2
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Great Britain led and directed the Allies; France was
seen as only a minor player. In the August 24 issue of Facts
in Review, the Library declared French participation as
invalid.

Instead, it claimed that "[France] gained

considerable territory as the result of the World War."15
Furthermore,

"The decision as to whether there will be war

has been handed to Britain, who in turn, handed the authority
to . . . Poland.

. . . The French people . . . don't know why

these risks have been taken."16
The early issue concentrated on the subject of the
Danzig Corridor, the flash point for World War II.
Frequently the Library used American opinion on the
Versailles settlement.

A speech to this effect by the German

Consul General for New York, Dr. Hans Borchers, was reprinted
by the Library.

"I only want to quote the words of one of the

most upright and honest of men . . . the late United States
Senator William Edgar Borah.

. . . 'The Polish Corridor must

be rectified. The present peace in Europe is the peace of
brutal force.'"17 In addition, Woodrow Wilson was held to have
opposed the creation of the corridor and only supported the
Corridor solution "at the insistence of others who sought
personal gain [although just where Poland's access to the sea

15 Facts in Review, August 24, 1939, p. 2

16 Ibid., 3.
17 Facts in Review,

February 5, 1940, p. 38.
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mentioned in the Fourteen Points should have been, is not
discussed] .1,18
Beyond the dictated peace of Versailles and the loss of
German land were the alleged provocations of Poland.

The

Eastern European nation had become a "constant menace to
order and progress in Europe."19 Further, the Poles, it
claimed, had embarked on a "program of 'more cannons and
fewer schools'."20 Thus, the German Library

claimed, Germany

had to right the wrong of Versailles and halt the aggression
of its eastern neighbor.
Vile as the Polish actions were portrayed to have been,
the ultimate responsibility for such excesses lay with
England. According to Thomsen: "Without England's
interference and her anti-German encirclement policy . . .

a

reasonable German-Polish adjustment could certainly have been
achieved long ago."21 Of England's leaders, Churchill drew the
heaviest criticism. One issue reprinted an accusation that
"his continuous battle-cry [was]
(Germany must be destroyed). . . .

'Germania delenda es t '
Churchill is no blessing

for the British people. They will regret . . . the man . . .

18 Facts in Review, September 2 1939, p. 1 After the article the
following slogan appeared at the bottom of the page: "Germany fights for
the reparation of an injustice, the others for its preservation."
19 Facts in Review,
September 2, 1939, p. 1 .
20 Ibid.
21 Facts in Review,
September 14, 1939, p., 7
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whose unscrupulous lust for power is responsible to a large
degree for the cataclysm in Europe.222
3
Even though war had begun, the Library reminded
Americans that Germany's aims remained moderate.

All that

was needed to restore peace was "a national frontier, which
corresponds to our ethnic, historic and economic necessities
. . . [and] the creation of a Polish rump-state which cannot
again be abused by the Western Powers.1,23 Americans were urged
not to pre-judge Germany in this conflict. Instead they
should be guided by "the legal principle . . . 'Audiatum et
Altera Pars'

(hear the other side, too)

[which] corresponds

. . . to the legal concept of the American people."24
The Library also fought the notion of Germany as a
totalitarian society.
Americans that,

In a speech, Dr. Borchers reminded

"We Germans did not surrender our freedom

under dictation, duress, or compulsion of any kind; of our
own free will we became an integral part of an organism
created under the guidance of . . . [Adolf Hitler]."25 More
convincingly, the idea of the Third Reich as more in tune
with traditional American concerns was played upon. Slogans
such as "Germany still upholds the freedom of seas"26 were

22 Facts in Review,
October 19, 1939, reprint of article by Dr.
Giselher Wirsing, p. 6.
23 Facts in Review, November 30, 1939, p. 1.
24 Facts in Review, September 14, 1939, p. 8. Speech by Thomsen.
Presumably his phrase concerning "the legal concept of the American
people" refers to the practice of due process.
25 Facts in Review, October 31, 1939, p. 7.
26 Ibid., 1.
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calculated to reinforce this notion.
Minister Ribbentrop,

In a speech by Foreign

quoted in Facts in Review, Americans

were reminded that Germany had respected the Monroe Doctrine
while Britain by her maintenance of colonies and interference
in the Western Hemisphere had clearly violated i t .
Furthermore, the issue continued, Britain had failed to pay
its Great War debt and was angling for similar loans in the
new conflict

(and would presumably not repay those loans

either).
Similarly,

the Germans sought to downplay the

significance of Britain's democratic institutions.
such as "Britain's

Headlines

Press is Free - Free to Distort"

underscored this message.

Presumably this was intended to

plant doubts in American minds about how truly democratic
England was.

At the same time the level of control by the

Nazis over the German press was minimized.
At the same time as it struggled to reduce the affinity
between the two English-speaking nations, the German Library
tried to minimize the danger posed to America by Hitler's
Germany.

This attempt was not always uniform, however. While

Facts in Review

sought to minimize the German threat to

America, it also sought to play up the Nazi military
advantage over Britain and France.

The net result was a

picture of the Reich that was one of vitality and strength,
yet one that hoped America would not be concerned over any
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possible threat that Germany's economic and military hegemony
over Europe might pose to the New World.

Thus, while the

magazine called fears of the Third Reich's intentions toward
the Western Hemisphere a "fable," it had no difficulty
claiming later in the same issue that Eastern Europe was the
concern of Germany alone.

The Germans, it maintained,

respected the right of the United States to maintain and
enforce the Monroe Doctrine and merely expected that America
would recognize

Germany's right to self determination and

its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as its Monroe
Doctrine.27

What was not mentioned by Thomsen was whether

Germany's new Monroe Doctrine would have its own version of
the Roosevelt Corollary. If the Germans included such a
corollary, with the right to intervene in those nations
within its sphere in the case of "chronic wrongdoing," they
would have the right to send troops whenever they felt it
necessary —
—

as the United States had done in Latin America

anywhere in Eastern Europe. With such assurances, the

Library sought to convince Americans that they need not
concern themselves with the fate of England or even of Europe
as a whole.
The British Empire's abuses were also vilified in the
pages of Facts in Review.

27

8.

No doubt playing on America's

Facts in Review, September 14, 1939, Speech by Thomsen, pp. 7-
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memory of her own Revolutionary War, the German Library

took

great pains to remind the United States of the paradox of a
democratic state that systematically denied democracy to
those under its colonial rule. The two most obvious examples
for this attack were Ireland and India.
In an article entitled "India: A Case Study of British
Democracy," the German Library

claimed that Senator John J.

Blaine of Wisconsin "some years ago" had condemned the
British use of violence against India as "a violation of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact and urged Britain to find a peaceful
solution to India's independence."28
Despite this

(and other) earlier pleas for Indian

independence, the nation had not been made independent and
Gandhi continued his famous non-violent resistance to British
rule.

Indeed, his refusal to support Britain, even after

Japan's entry into the war, led to his imprisonment in 1942.
The Library exploited this conflict, hoping that British
repression would anger the United States. Frequent stories of
Indian tribulations abounded and Gandhi frequently quoted:
"Gandi [sic] declared that despite statements to the contrary
by Prime Minister Chamberlain, the old Imperialist spirit of
Britain is not dead."29

As a show of good will towards India

it was announced that "Indians residing in Germany will not

28 Facts in Review, January 6, 1941, p. 8.
29 Facts in Review, December 15, 1939, p. 8.
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be treated as enemy aliens. The Reich holds that India is at
war with Germany only by compulsion and not of its free
will."30

The Library continued this course by reporting on

Gandhi's progress.

"Mohandas Ghandi [sic]

. . . calls for

volunteers to conduct . . . civil disobedience . . . against
British rule.

'Non-violent action' he observes 'can mean the

mobilization of world opinion in our favor,

. . . men and

women all over the world are sick of the war spirit and [are]
longing for a way to peace. India can show that way if we are
honestly non-violent.'"31 The Library certainly hoped he would
succeed.
The problem of Northern Ireland had plagued Britain for
decades. Memories of the rebellion of 1916 were still fresh
in the minds of Irish-Americans. Certainly the refusal of
Ireland to aid Britain during this critical time
spoke volumes about the hard feelings between the neighboring
islands. Facts

made much of this hesitation, noting with

glee: "Ireland, England's next-door neighbor . . . refuses to
come to the aid of Great Britain.

...

In South Africa,

advocates of war and advocates of neutrality are almost
equally divided. In India passive resistance is the watchword
. . . . It is obvious the Empire is disintegrating."32

30 Ibid.
31 Facts in Review, April 8, 1940, p. 134.
32 Facts in Review, May 26, 1941, p. 289.
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Given the large Irish-American community in the United
States,

it is not surprising that Ireland also featured

prominently in Facts in Review.

The journal urged its

readers not to assume all British colonial abuses were in the
past: "Never let him forget that at the same time Britain
. . . [was] pleading repentance in 1916,
murdering,

. . . she was

robbing and flogging with all her old-time

abandon."33 Also,

"Ireland has suffered under English

domination more than any other nation —

and longer.

Northern Ireland is still controlled by the British.

British

methods in Ireland are so notorious that they require no
elucidation at this point."34

Moreover, it was contended that

Ireland was
continuing to be held to ensure Britain's command of the sea.
Therefore,
The freedom of the seas is essential to universal
liberty. This freedom cannot be achieved while English
Orders in Council can destroy any small neutral country
and drive from the sea the commerce even of great
neutral powers. The destruction of England's domination
of the seas would leave England— as she deserves to be
left— one of the Great Powers, but would prevent her
from meddling in the affairs of all other countries
. . . . This freedom they can never have while England
dominates and controls Ireland. . . .35

33 Facts in Review,
34 Facts in Review,
35 Facts in Review,

April 2, 1941, p. 154.
January 6, 1940, p. 8.
February 19, 1949, p. 54.
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Facts in Review

was convinced that the age of British

Imperialism had not passed. Furthermore, it postulated that
Churchill wanted to "invade or annex" Ireland because it
refused to cooperate with the English. The German Library
applauded Ireland's neutrality.

"It has been able to stay out

of the European holocaust into which other small states,
pretending to be neutral . . . were drawn one by one. Are we
soon to witness an attempt to 'restore' to the Irish people
the benefits of the 'great, free and happy' Empire which they
so dearly 'loved' in the past?"36 In case anyone had failed to
make the connection between America's revolution and the
situation within the British domains, the Library pointed it
o u t . "Great Britain has attempted to destroy every nation
that dared to order its life independent of British
despotism. Only the United States of America was able . . .
to free itself successfully from the British yoke."37 The
German Library

no doubt hoped that India and Ireland

(including Northern Ireland) would follow the American
example.
The reasons for England's troubles were more than simply
internal dissent within the Empire, according to the German
Library. The British, by their actions throughout the world,
had earned their problems. British attacks on the remnants of
the French Navy at Dakar,

in July 1940, provided proof of

36 Facts in Review, November 18, 1939, p. 544.
37 Facts in Review, May 13, 1940, p. 190.
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Britain's continuing imperialism. In October 1940 Facts in
Review

gave its interpretation:

"Even British ingenuity

cannot find an excuse for the assault on Dakar led by a
French traitor with the aid of the British Navy.

. . . The

incident was part of a systematic British campaign to rob her
vanquished ally of her colonies."38

This only confirmed in

the eyes of the propagandists continuing abuses by Britannia.
Neutrals could look forward to the treatment Norway had
received in the Altmark

incident

(English ships had violated

Norwegian neutrality to rescue seamen captured during the
cruise of the Graf Spee).

This incident was dramatized to

Americans by comparing it to the Essex
1812

case of the War of

(where the British had denied the idea of neutral trade

via the so-called "broken voyage" and thereby decided what
neutral trade was and more importantly, what it was not ) . The
message of the German Library

article was plain: Britain had

no intention of respecting any nation's neutral rights.39
The journal also went beyond these historical arguments
to accuse England of still greater crimes. In a description
of the cruise of the Graf Spee

it accused the British of

using mustard gas against the ship.40

In addition airplanes

38 Facts in Review, October 2, 1940, p. 489.
39 Facts in Review, March 4, 1940, p. 76 Headline:

Disregard for Neutrals Not New."
40 Facts in Review, December 28, 1939, p. 2.

"British
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were reputed to have been dropping self-igniting cards
throughout Germany to create terror.41
Morale in England was supposed to be a problem,
according to the Library. In the case of the British "blank
check" to Poland, it was maintained that "The British people
are not permitted to know that . . . any help Britain might
attempt to give [Poland] would arrive too late."42 Labor
unrest in the United Kingdom was purported to be rampant:
"According to the Goteborgs Handels-Hach Sjofartstidning, a
leading Swedish newspaper, more than a million British
workers are clamoring for wage increases . . . [because of]
the huge profits realized by the armament industry since the
beginning of the war."43

The underlying reason for the low

morale in England was their reason for fighting:

"The

British Government is fighting for capitalist interests.

. .

. She desires to have Germany in a state of economic
dependency."44

Contrasted with this Germany's reasons were:

"economically . . .

a reasonable standard of living . . .

strategically . . . protection against domination by some
great maritime hegemony . . . diplomatically speaking.

. . a

'good neighbor' policy."45
41 Facts in Review, September 16, 1940, Facts in Review claimed
that the true victims of these bomb-like weapons were "children and
others who are deceived by their harmless appearance." p. 468.
42 Facts in Review, August 24, 1939, p. 3.
43 Facts in Review, September 9, 1940, p 440. This issue also
contained a story of a man jailed for predicting the victory of Hitler's
forces.
44 Facts in Review, February 19, 1940, p. 50
45 Facts in Review, April 15, 1940, 146
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The alleged antagonism of neutral nations towards
Britain supported the Third Reich's claims. The German
Library's attitudes towards the Versailles Treaty
have already been noted. Less easy to explain were Germany's
more contradictory acts, such as the relationship with the
Soviet Union. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August
1939 was in force during the entire run of Facts in Review,
thereby sparing the journal the need to reverse its largely
pro-Russian line. Accordingly the Library stressed the
positive aspects of the relationship. German-Soviet economic
agreements were frequently mentioned and it was emphasized
that these agreements represented the "permanency
of their mutual relationship."'56 The Library even alleged that
Britain was at fault for prolonging the Winter War between
Finland and Russia.4
47
6
Far more important to the German Library of Information
than justifying Germany's actions, was pointing out
opposition to British goals and tactics towards other
nations.

In its campaign against the British abuse of the

freedom of the seas, the journal used the outrage of Japan
over British infringements on neutral trade rights. Indeed
46 Facts in Review, April 8, 1940, p. 134.

47 The Library based this accusation on Britain's alleged promises
to Finland. This support, coupled with Finnish success in the Winter War
prevented the Finns from compromising with Soviet demands. The U.S.S.R.
could not withdraw without humiliation. "Propagandist exaggerations
. . . by the British press . . . tend to transform the entire RussoFinnish conflict into a question of prestige for the Soviet Union. It is
this Propaganda [from Britain] which is the chief obstacle to peace."
Facts in Review, January 22, 1940, p. 22.
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the English were openly accused of sinking the Athena early
in the war to arouse neutral sentiment
American sentiment)

(and especially

in hopes of reviving the memory of the

Lusitania sinking that had so outraged the United States.48
Thus, Facts in Review

showed the hostility of many neutrals

to Britain's unilateral restrictions. "Japan will not
hesitate to take retaliatory action if the British persist in
their plan of disregarding neutral rights.

. . . During the

Napoleonic Wars, it will be recalled, the United States under
Thomas Jefferson enacted and applied retaliatory embargo
legislation against England's violation of American rights."49
Russia too protested British actions.

"The Russian press has

shown considerable interest in the . . . German White Books.
The new publications are hailed for their . . . expose of the
Anglo-French policy of war extension. Particular attention is
given to the fact that the erstwhile Allies sought to spread
hostilities to every Russian border."50 Presumably Americans
were to infer that the current war posed a threat to their
rights to trade freely and that they should heed the example
of Japan and Russia, as well as the experience of their own
past, and oppose the willful British.

48 Facts in Review, September 9, 1939, p. 1. The Germans sank the
Lusitania in 1915 with a torpedo. Over 100 Americans died in the
incident, which created much animosity towards Germany. The Germans did
not want to repeat the situation in 1939.
49 Facts in Review, December 8, 1939, p.3.
50 Facts in Review, July 29, 1940, p. 355.
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While the English were being portrayed as the
instigators of the war, they were also pictured as suffering
from its effects to a much greater degree than Germany. In
fact, the journal maintained an image of Nazi Germany hardly
changed by the war, where life went on more or less as
normal.

Militarily, economically and scientifically, Germany

was consistently shown to be vastly superior to the British.
This campaign began during the so-called "phony war"

of late

1939 to early 1940. The German "Strength through Joy"
movement was said to be continuing its improvements in
average people's lives and even expanding its activities to
the soldiers at the front.51
On the scientific front, consumer advances gained the
most notice. Innovations such as coal soap, synthetic tires
and coal gasification all merited significant space in Facts
in Review.

Even the film industry of Germany was said to be

"not only intact, but prosperous and progressive . . .

in

sharp contrast to the disastrous reversals suffered by the
British and French."52

Economically two trends were visible.

First, Germany's insulation from blockade

(via trade with the

U.S.S.R. and scientific advances) was proclaimed. More
importantly, the desire of Germany to re-enter into trade
with United States after the war was emphasized. Evidence of

51 Facts in Review, February 13, 1940, p. 47 The article features
such front line niceties as a bookmobile that was used to help the
soldiers keep up on their reading.
52 Facts in Review, October 28, 1940, 522.
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the first trend has been shown. It is necessary to look
briefly at the Library's attempts to reassure America that
Germany would not look for markets to replace its trade with
America in the long term.
Two quotes best exemplify this attitude.

"Germany may

easily become America's best post-war customer. Let us hope
that it will be possible after the termination of the war to
eliminate the frictions of the past
benefit of both nations."53

...

to the mutual

The journal was sure to press its

claim for a European sphere of influence, but was quick to
remind its readers that: "Neither the European Continent nor
Germany desires to continue the self-sufficiency of wartime
as the ideal economic relation for peacetime. . . .

[The two

countries should pursue] friendly competition in the interest
of all states, without destructive and artificial economic
barriers, discriminations and

boycotts."54 In another issue

the magazine gave one example of hope for the post-war era:
"The Volkswagen plant has been adapted to turning out
military equipment. But with the coming of peace . . . the
production of [the eventual VW beetle] will be taken up again
. . . . Dr. Porsche's dream will at last come true."55
Facts in Review

also tried to minimize the conception

of Germany as a ruthless totalitarian state. The claim of
religious toleration was a major means of achieving this
53 Facts in Review, June 17, 1940, p. 250.
54 Facts in Review, January 13 1941, p. 10.
55 Facts in Review, May 26, 1941, 313.
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goal. Frequent notice was given throughout the journal's run
of religious observations.

Indeed, special issues were

dedicated to the celebration of WhitSunday (Pentecost). The
conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Germany was not
a concern.

"One of the most important elements of anti-German

propaganda . . .

is the assertion that the National Socialist

regime persecutes the Catholic religion and endeavors to
replace a Christian philosophy with a neo-pagan one.
[this is untrue]"56

. . .

Yet the image of Germany as continuing

its traditional religious toleration was refuted by other
articles on religion. Pictures of church ceremonies featured
Nazi honor guards and swastika flags around the altar. And,
as Dr. Heckel of the German Evangelical Church said, "the new
Reformation

[National Socialism]

has also created a wealth

of new hymns and vigorous, happy songs. The German people
have now recovered from the frightful wrongs and sufferings
inflicted upon them after the World War. Their grief and
sorrow and the materialistic moral decline have been washed
away by new courage and new strength."57
Pictures featured prominently in the journal. At first
there were no photographs or drawings of any kind. Gradually
small photographs began to appear in its pages. Later,
photographs would consume, at times, half of the space in an
issue. The photographs also had a propaganda message. Often
56 Facts in Review, October 29, 1940, p. 514.
57 Facts in Review, May 6, 1940, p. 178.
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German youths were shown frolicking in

meadows, or some such

pastoral scene. A darker side was

also evident. As the war

progressed, battle photographs as

well as pictures of

Germany's military leaders became

more evident. By the use

these images, Facts in Review

of

sought to portray a peaceful

Germany that had been thrust into war, willing

and capable

of doing whatever was necessary to win it.
As European nations fell under Nazi occupation, many
people in the United States began to fear for the safety of
the populations of these nations. Facts in Review,

aware of

this concern, made frequent mention of "progress" in Poland,
France and elsewhere. Denmark had fallen to the Germans in
April of 1940. Pictures of its King, Christian X, who chose
to remain in the country, graced one issue while the
accompanying article stated that "in Denmark there were no
ravages of war to repair because its king refused to make
his country a pawn of the Allies on the checker-board of
diplomacy and war."58 Also, plans for a tunnel to Sweden were
said to be advancing, giving the impression that in certain
parts of Europe at least, things were progressing well. The
Jewish question was conspicuously absent from Facts in
Review. In fact the verbal assault against the Jews only
appears in translations of Hitler's speeches. Hitler's
speeches, interestingly enough, appeared only infrequently in
the pages of the journal.
58 Facts in Review, June 7, 1940,p. 222.
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The magazine sought to contradict the notion of a Europe
in chains under Nazi domination and, above all, to convince
its readers that Germany, even if victorious in Europe,
constituted no threat to America.
on this issue were reprinted:

Hermann Goering's opinions

"He stressed Germany's desire

to preserve and uphold her political and economic ties with
the United States

[and he considered] a healthy

reconstruction of Europe and of the world is possible only in
cooperation with the United States."59 On the same issue
Hitler is quoted concerning America's role in Europe.

"The

essence of the Monroe Doctrine was not only to prevent
European states from interfering in American affairs

(which

England with her great political and territorial interests in
America keeps doing incessantly); but quite as much to
restrain the North American Union from meddling with European
affairs ."60
Thus Americans were assured that they had nothing to
fear, militarily and economically, from a victorious Germany.
However, the United States also needed to recognize that
while Germany would not interfere in the American sphere,
Germany would tolerate no outside interference in its
European sphere.

59 Facts in Review, Aug 12, 1940, p. 378. Italicized in original.
50 Facts in Review, July 1, 1940, p. 282.

Chapter Five
The Dies Committee and the Fate of the Library
The activities of the German Library
notice of the U.S. Government.

did not escape the

As the Library expanded,

it

became more visible. In 1940 Representative Martin Dies from
Texas and the Committee on Un-American Activities and
Propaganda in the United States began to focus their
attention on the German Library, as they had previously on
the German-American Bund and communist groups.
The Committee clearly defined the difference between
American and un-American activities:
Americanism is the recognition of the . . .inherent
and fundamental rights of man . . . [derived] from God
and not from governments. . . . Among these inalienable
rights . . . are 1) Freedom of worship; 2) freedom of
speech; 3) freedom of press; 4) freedom of
assemblage. . . . The essence of Americanism is
therefore class, religious, and racial tolerance. . . .
The man who advocates class hatred is plainly unAmerican even if he professes racial and religious
tolerance.1
The ideas set out by the Committee conflicted with one
another. Just how freedom of speech could be reconciled with
the censure of unpopular views was unclear. Many Americans

1 U.S. House of Representatives Report no. 2 Investigation of UnAmerican Activities and Propaganda, p. 10. 76th Congress 1st Session.
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in this period of racial segregation and bigotry would hardly
qualify as loyal Americans under the Committee's definition.
Crystal clear, however, was the intent of the Committee to
defend the United States from enemies abroad and within.
Americans who used their freedom of speech to support either
Communist or Fascist ideology were at risk of being labelled
un-American and even being jailed for these views. The vile
nature of the Nazi regime cannot be condoned. However, the
throttling of freedom of speech before the outbreak of the
war is also reprehensible. In a minority report of the Dies
Committee Jerry Voorhis of California recognized the threat
to free speech.
Once, however, the [Dies] committee undertakes to
accuse people of un-American activities because they
criticize certain features of our economy or say unkind
things about finance, capitalism or because they come
out for a greater degree of cooperation in our economic
life, it is in danger of becoming an agency that
arrogates to itself the right to censor people's ideas.
That in itself is un-American. . . . The majority report
is shot through with statements accusing people of being
un-American not because they are Nazis, Fascists, or
Communists, but because their political or economic
beliefs or opinions are not orthodox as judged by the
committee majority.2

Nevertheless, the records of the German Library of
Information were subpoenaed by the Committee in August 1940
and its officials were required to present themselves for
questioning. The director of the Library, Dr. Matthias
2 77th Congress 2nd session Report 2277 part 2. July 7, 1942,
4-5.
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Schmitz, testified before the committee and was asked to
explain the Library's relationship to the Consulate. Schmitz
testified that the Library had been separate from the
Consulate as of September 1939.

The Library submitted a

report to the Committee detailing the number of employees and
their functions. These included a central or administrative
section, research, archives, mailing, correspondence, book
keeping and editorial departments. There were 30 employees,
all of whom were German nationals. Also included in the
report was George Viereck and his relationship to the
Library.3
The New York Times followed the proceedings of the
Committee closely. It reprinted the accusation that the
Library constituted a "local fifth column and Nazi spy
headquarters"
Library

as

and, more truthfully, reporting the German
"one of the largest German agencies in this

country for the dissemination of Nazi information."4 The
Library was linked to the Trans-Ocean organization in this
probe.5 The Dies report included several letters between the
two organizations, which showed that Trans-Ocean served as a
source of information and articles for the Library.6 This

3 Appendix, 1047-1049.
4 New York Times August 31, 1940 p. 4:3 "Reich Library Here Gets
Dies Summons."
5 See above, page 29, for Thomsen's admission that Trans-Ocean was
recognized as a Nazi agency.
6 Appendix, 1051-1052.
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connection showed that the Library relied on Nazi agencies
for some of its information, which obviously undermined the
Library's claims of independence. While the Committee and its
chairman were convinced by their investigation that such
activities as those carried on by the German Library
constituted a threat to the U.S., it was not until June of
1941 that action was taken to close the German Library of
Information.
In the meantime, the Library had become involved in
difficulties of a different sort. In connection with its
mailing practices,

it has been mentioned that several

individuals had become upset at being placed on the German
Library's mailing list.

The Library found itself sued in New

York Court by the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League for failing
to register its activities properly. Because it had
officially separated from the Consulate in September 1939 in
order to appear a more objective source of information, the
Library was considered a private organization. As such it was
required to register with the City.7 The court case alleged
that the Library failed to follow the law, and Schmitz was
imprisoned. In order to secure his release, the Embassy in
Washington was forced to come forth with proof that the
German Library

did not need the City certificate because it

was an agency of the Nazi Government. The ruling of the judge

i

New York Times September 14, 1940 p. 5:2

62
was of interest: "However contemptible the defendant may be
in other respects,

[a] great disservice would be done to any

government of laws if the defendant were to be punished
otherwise than in accordance with the law."8
The Library also suffered another public image setback
when an individual wrote to the Times

to compare the German

Library with the British Library of Information.9 The British
organization was small; it permitted private citizens to see
its mailing list of 4,000 names. The German Library of
Information, by comparison, was secretive with its 70,000name list. Also the comparison of the British Library's
American staff with the German Library's all-German staff,
did not support the Library's claim of objectivity.
The combination of the Dies investigation, the arrest of
Schmitz, the Library's German staff, and ties to the
Consulate and Embassy lost for it any sort of credibility it
had built up as an objective organization. The directives
originally established for the Library suggested staying away
from indigenous American groups working towards the same
ends, i.e., to keep the U.S. out of war. The maintenance of a
German staff and its physical nearness to the consulate were
strange oversights indeed for an organization designed to
convince the American public that it was in their own
8 New York Times September 20, 1940 p. 9:30 "Nazi Agent Freed on
Embassy Plea."
9 New York Times
September 18, 1940 p. 22:6 letter from R.W. Rus.
"On the Matter of Propaganda."
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best interest to keep the U.S. out of a European war. For the
time being, however, the Library was allowed to continue its
activities.
The worsening relations between Washington and Berlin
caused by a series of incidents, beginning in November 1938
with Kristallnacht, culminated in the closing of the German
Library of Information. On June 16, 1941 the Under Secretary
of State, Sumner Welles, presented a note to officials of the
German Embassy in Washington requesting that the German
Consulates throughout the country and organizations
affiliated with them (such as the Library, Trans-Ocean and
the German Railway and Tourist Agency) be closed. The reason
given for this decision was as follows:
It has come to the knowledge of this Government
that agencies of the German Reich in this country,
including German consular establishments, have been
engaged in activities wholly outside the scope of their
legitimate duties. These activities have been of an
improper and unwarranted character. They render the
continued presence in the United States of those
agencies and consular establishments inimical to the
welfare of this country.10

Thomsen rejected this decision as "arbitrary and unfounded."
Nevertheless, the Consulates and other organizations attached
to them, including the German Library, had until July 10,
1941 to comply. The Library had ceased to exist.

10
Memorandum from Secretary of State to German Charge June 16,
1941. Reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume II
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office,1949), 629.
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The employees of the Library returned to Germany. For
George Sylvester Viereck, an American citizen, the solution
was not so easy. Viereck, it will be recalled, had served the
Library as editor of Facts in Review, as well as in other
respects

(none of his activities on behalf of the Library

were public knowledge). For this work, as well as his
affiliation with the publishing house of Flanders Hall and
other activities, Viereck was indicted.

This was a bizarre

ending to the story of the man who most directly influenced
the output of the German Library of Information.11 He was
convicted of failing to accurately report his activities
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and was sentenced
to 8 months to 2 years on each count.1
12 However,

in March 1943

the Supreme Court threw out his conviction. He was retried in
June 1943 and found guilty again. He was sentenced to 1-5
years. At the same time he was tried under the Sedition Act
for allegedly promoting insubordination among the U.S. Armed
Forces. He was never convicted of this crime, but due to the
fact that the trial dragged on from April 1944 to the spring
of 1947, Viereck was not granted parole on his Foreign Agent
Act conviction until May of that year.13
11 Matthias Schmitz, as Heinz Beller before him, had been the
nominal head of the German Library. They were administrators, while
Viereck did most of the actual work of editing.
12 The information on the legal battles of Viereck can be found in
Neil M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist.
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 206-250.
13 Viereck wrote letters to the District Court in Washington in
order to request parole. He also sent these letters to Senator Langer,
requesting his assistance. The letters were unremarkable. For their
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The conviction and harassment of Viereck confirmed the
fears of the Dies Committee minority report quoted
previously. George Viereck was guilty of supporting a vile
regime that represented a dire threat to the world. However
his support was within the Constitutional boundaries of
freedom of speech and his activities had occurred prior to
the outbreak of war. In his support and work with Nazi
agencies,

including the German Library, he was guilty only of

associating with a foreign government. One author interpreted
Viereck's actions. "The machinations of Viereck, along with
those of the Native Fascists, presented a challenge of the
first order to a government committed to freedom of speech
and political activity, and yet obligated to protect itself
against political danger."14 Viereck undertook his activities
because he was convinced that Germany was being unjustly
criticized. Unfortunately, he failed to withdraw his support
after the truly heinous nature of the Third Reich became
visible. While the actions of Viereck were distasteful, the
repression of his unpopular viewpoint was the most
regrettable feature of the story of the Library.15

contents see Orin G. Libby Manuscript Collection, Elwyn B. Robinson
Department of Special Collections, Chester Fritz Library, University of
North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota. William Langer Papers, Box 128,
Folder 25.
14 Morris Schonbach, Native Fascism during the 1930 's and 1940 's:
A Study of its Roots, its Growth, and its Decline (Unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis: University of California, 1958), 358.
15 In addition, much of the evidence against Viereck was obtained
without a search warrant. Johnson, p. 224.

Conclusion

Having looked at German policies in the instance of the
German Library of Information, what can be said about Nazi
propaganda in the United States?

First, it seems clear that

the Library (and as far as one can generalize, Germany
itself) sought chiefly to keep the U.S. from actively
involving itself in the war in Europe. The Nazis attempted to
do this by

issuing pamphlets and Facts in Review.

The pamphlets, published throughout the Library's
existence, represented limited opportunities to express an
opinion independent of Berlin. Independent expression
generally was in the preface or conclusion to these works.
Even so a clear propaganda line can be found: that Britain's
interference on the Continent was responsible for the war.
Furthermore, it claimed, England had prolonged the war and
expanded it into previously neutral nations

(Norway, etc.).

All of these actions aimed to deny Germany its place in
Europe. Coupled with this was a blind ambition to cripple
Germany under the unfair terms of the Versailles Treaty.
Along with the disreputable motives of Britain,
the German Library of Information emphasized the economic,
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military, and cultural strength of Germany. The reason for
this two-fold approach is easy to explain. The German Library
did not want America actively intervening in the war and
sought to convince it not to do so by "exposing" Britain's
aims and methods, thereby making alliance with England
distasteful. Just as important, it also tried to present
Germany as a modern colossus, immune from assault, even from
America. Thus the German Library presented United States
entry into the conflict as only serving Britain and possibly
failing to defeat Germany in the bargain.
Facts in Review

also followed that path. In this

journal the Library was much freer to express its
propagandist opinions than it had been in the translations of
official German publications. The weekly, over the course of
its run, grew from a sparse four pages in 1939 to almost 40
pages in 1941.

Again, and in much greater detail than in the

pamphlets, Facts in Review repeated the idea of

the perfidy

of Britain, but emphasized German actions as a new Monroe
Doctrine more than the pamphlets had. Certainly the German
Library of Information tried to reassure Americans of the
non-threatening nature of Nazi Germany, while reminding its
readers of the military prowess of the state. The picture
presented by Facts in Review
what in the Library's
a new Germany,

was similar to

the one shown

other publications; a presentation of

strong in culture, economics and the military

arts. This nation, moreover, was currently acting as other

68

nations had —

in its own interests —

but presented no

threat to others, once its Lebensraum had been achieved. It
preferred peace, of course, but was prepared to fight, and
win, any war forced on it.
Did the German Library achieve the goals for its
propaganda campaign? Certainly the Library followed Hitler's
basic ideas of broad-based propaganda appeals constantly
repeated that did not distinguish between degrees of guilt.
In addition, Dr. Thomsen's recommendations were also
employed, particularly the emphasis on the negative lessons
of American intervention in World War I, and the parallel
between Nazi actions in Europe and American actions under the
Monroe Doctrine. It also sought to undermine American
sympathy for Great Britain by reminding Americans of
England's past and present abuses of neutral rights. Thus the
Library presented the war to its American readers as an
unnecessary event caused by Britain. The United States, by
assisting England, would only compromise the application of
national self-determination abroad. Moreover, the outcome of
the war need not concern its readers, the Library reassured
them, because a victorious Third Reich posed no threat to the
security of the Western Hemisphere.
Can an assessment be made of how effective the German
Library of Information was in its propaganda campaign? The
U.S. remained neutral from September 1939 to December 1941,
in the face of considerable pressure —

from the British and
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increasingly Roosevelt himself —

to join the Allied cause.

Roosevelt believed that despite his destroyer deal of 1940
and the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, he could not count absolutely
on American public support for active intervention in Europe.
Obviously it cannot be assumed that this was the result of
Nazi propaganda,

let alone that it was due to the influence

of the German Library.

In the end, Nazi aggression in

Poland, France and throughout Europe convinced Americans to
oppose Hitler.
The Gallup Polls of the time can provide some insight
into the attitude of Americans to the Third Reich. In
September 1939 82 percent of Americans polled believed that
Germany was responsible for the outbreak of war, while only 3
percent believed that Britain and France were to blame.1

The

best gauge of increasing American animosity towards the Third
Reich were the following questions. In October 1939,
Americans were asked,

"If it appears that Germany is

defeating England and France, should the United States
declare war on Germany and send our army and navy to Europe
to fight?" 71 percent answered no to the question.1
2 In the
same month, however,

84 percent of Americans polled wanted

the Allies to win the war. The German Library of Information
sought to exploit this paradox. Thomsen had acknowledged that
American publican opinion was against Nazi Germany in 1939.
1 Dr. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971.
Volume I (New York: Random House, 1972), 179.
2 Ibid. p. 186.
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He was right. The Library was set up to help change American
opinion. Did it succeed?
It is not possible to prove directly that the German
Library of Information's propaganda campaign was successful
or unsuccessful. The Gallup Polls offered mixed results. On
one hand, 76 percent of Americans opposed active entry into
the war.3 However, in response to the question,

"Would you

rather see Britain surrender to Germany than have the United
States go into the war?",

62 percent answered no.4 While a

majority of Americans still opposed U.S. entry into the
conflict, a significant shift had occurred in those willing
to go to war to save Britain.
What does all of this prove? While the statistics are
not conclusive, American opinion of Germany worsened from
1939 to 1941. This cannot be said to have been the fault of
the German Library of Information, but clearly Nazi
propaganda in the United States failed to shift American
public opinion to a more sympathetic view of the Third Reich.
Nazi propaganda and the German Library of Information
utilized the ideas examined here in an attempt to reinforce
isolationist notions, but it is by no means clear that German
propaganda and the German Library of Information decisively
aided the spread of this sentiment. The New York Times was
clearly unmoved. In April 1941, it pointed out the
3 Ibid. 286.
4 Ibid. 282.
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contradictions between the Library's appeals for peace and
Germany's actions in the Balkans. The newspaper concluded:
"The editors of Facts in Review

are our guests, allowed by

our national hospitality to sneer, to insult our friends, to
belittle what we hold sacred. It is only fair to do what one
can to enlarge the scope of their 'Facts'."5
German propaganda in World War II was generally of good
quality and the Library was above average. It was somewhat
more subdued in manner than most German propaganda; for
example, aside from a few

reprints of Hitler's speeches, the

harangue of hatred against the Jews, so common in Nazi
rhetoric, never appears.
The Library was justified in some of its views. The
Versailles Treaty was harsh, the Polish Corridor was a denial
of German national self-determination, and the British did
violate Norwegian neutrality. To these examples can be added
the British treatment of the people of its Empire

(especially

in India) and the similarity between of Germany's
expansionist desires and the American use of the Monroe
Doctrine.

In its propaganda campaign the German Library

struck many sparks. These sparks never burst into flame, as
most Americans realized that no matter how polished the
arguments, German propaganda, as represented by the German

5
Facts."

New York Times April 27, 1941 Section 4, p 10 "'Facts' and
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Library of Information, was based on half-truths and lies and
only served as a facade for a vile repressive regime.

t
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